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This article sheds light on the foreign policies of China, Russia, and Turkey towards 
the controversial Iranian nuclear program and analyzes to what extent their policies 
are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. While advocating a non-
hegemonic security culture discursively, China, Russia, and Turkey still partially 
adhere to hegemonic power structures on a behavioral level. These states’ policies 
are the outcome of a balancing act between resistance to hegemony and hegemonic 
accommodation. The analysis in this article nuances the idea that counter-hegemonic 
discourses of rising powers always herald a revisionist power transition. The article 
thereby makes a contribution to the scholarly debate about emerging powers and the 
coexistence between declining hegemonic powers and norm-shapers in the making.
Keywords Iranian nuclear program, hegemony, norm contestation, China, Russia,  
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Introduction
When in 2002, components of Iran’s nuclear program came to light that were 
undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and therefore 
in breach of Iran’s Safeguards Agreements as a member of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT), Western governments reacted with alarm. The U.S. 
government quickly warned of the danger of a possible military dimension to the 
Iranian nuclear program and started pressuring Tehran to fully cooperate with 
the IAEA. Through its public discourse, the United States began to securitize 
the Iranian nuclear file and publicly warned of an Iranian nuclear bomb. In the 
absence of direct U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations, the Europeans engaged in 
diplomatic attempts to solve the emerging Iranian nuclear crisis—but to no avail. 
When the file was transferred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
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in 2006, the format for negotiations changed from the E3 (Germany, France, 
Great Britain) to the P5+1 (the five permanent UNSC members plus Germany). 
Cooperation with Russia and China on approaching Iran’s nuclear file was now 
necessary and it soon became apparent that Moscow and Beijing favored different 
policies than those of the West. Other actors joined the Iran diplomacy at later 
moments with attempts to mediate between the West and Iran. Turkey was one 
of those mediators and engaged in a proactive phase of shuttle diplomacy and 
managed to secure the first Iranian agreement to a proposed nuclear deal in May 
2010. In doing so, Ankara emphasized policies and diplomatic priorities that 
resembled the Chinese and Russian rhetoric more than the position of the U.S.-
dominated Western camp at the time. 
This article sheds light on the Iran policies of China, Russia and Turkey, 
and more specifically, on their foreign policies towards the controversial Iranian 
nuclear program. While publically advocating a non-hegemonic security culture, 
China, Russia, and Turkey still partially accept hegemonic structures because of 
a level of material and political dependence on the United States. The author’s 
argument in this article nuances the idea that counter-hegemonic discourses 
of rising powers always herald a revisionist power transition. It will be argued 
instead that their policies are the outcome of a balancing act between resistance 
to hegemony and hegemonic accommodation. 
For a number of reasons, the choice of case studies in this article is 
illuminating for an analysis of a security culture that resists hegemony. First, 
the diplomacy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program is a contested policy domain 
and arguably serves as a microcosm for resistance to a U.S.-dominated world 
order where key paradigms of U.S. foreign policy are challenged. Second, the 
Iranian nuclear crisis reveals contentions about world ideology and the status 
of Iran in international relations. Especially with a view to complicated U.S.-
Iranian relations, an analysis of contestation of U.S. policies in this case sheds 
light on challenges to U.S. conceptions of world order and Iran’s role therein. And 
third, it allows new theoretical insights into alternatives to hegemonic power 
structures and security cultures in a post-U.S. hegemony world. It will be the 
aim of this article to elaborate on these points and to comparatively analyze the 
commonalities between Chinese, Russian, and Turkish policies in relation to Iran. 
Such a comparative analysis allows the author to draw conclusions on the extent 
to which Chinese, Russian, and Turkish foreign policies towards Iran’s nuclear 
program are indicative of a security culture resisting hegemony. 
The first section briefly outlines the foreign policies of China, Russia, and 
Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear program that was uncovered in 2002. The 
second section introduces the Coxian concept of hegemony and analyzes how 
China, Russia, and Turkey engage in normative disagreement with Iran sanctions 
regimes over their institutional nature. The third section shows how the “de-
Westernization” of Iran discourses is related to divergence from hegemony in 
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its ideational dimension. A fourth section makes sense of Chinese, Russian, and 
Turkish partial convergence with hegemony in its material dimension. On the 
basis of this analysis, the final section analyzes the seeming ambiguity between 
the advocacy for counter-hegemonic security cultures on a discursive level and 
the partial adherence to U.S.-dominated governance structures on a behavioral 
level, and draws conclusions on the extent to which the Iran policies of China, 
Russia and Turkey resist hegemony. The research method comprises qualitative 
document analysis, complemented by semi-structured elite interviews with 
experts and decision-makers. 
Russian, Chinese, and Turkish Approaches to the Iranian Nuclear 
Crisis
Russian, Chinese, and Turkish foreign policies towards the controversial nuclear 
program of Iran display a security culture that is different from a U.S.-inspired 
hegemonic security culture. When the hitherto undeclared Iranian nuclear 
program was uncovered in 2002, it did not take long for discursive dividing lines 
to emerge. While the Bush administration was pursuing an assertive foreign 
policy line on Iran, going so far as to threaten Iran with an attack and regime 
change (the incorporation of Iran into the infamous “Axis of Evil” being arguably 
the most dramatic and tangible discursive step in this process of securitization), 
China, Russia, and Turkey reacted with caution and were more hesitant to 
assume Iranian intentions on the basis of contested proliferation concerns. Yet, 
Russia, China, and Turkey held that pressure was not conducive to achieving 
greater cooperation by the Iranians concerning their nuclear file with the IAEA, 
and publicly reiterated that diplomacy was of the utmost importance for working 
towards a political solution of the emerging nuclear crisis. 
Against the background of Russia’s nuclear technology cooperation with 
Iran in the 1990s, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow made 
a distinction between what it regarded as legitimate nuclear cooperation and 
an alarmist securitization of Iran’s nuclear program. From the beginning of 
the nuclear standoff in 2002, the Putin administration therefore emphasized 
the Iranian right to nuclear power (Putin 2003; Mousavian 2012, 163). When 
the nuclear file was then referred to the UNSC as a result of failed diplomatic 
attempts to solve the crisis, Russia worked together with China towards slowing 
down the pressure on Iran and watering down drafts of sanctions resolutions 
(Patrikarakos 2012, 224). The eventual adoption of sanctions resolutions bore 
witness to an increasing realization in Moscow and Beijing of Iranian delaying 
techniques and also to a level of receptiveness to U.S. pressure. In addition, 
Russian proposals to bring about political solutions (like the “Russian plan” of 
2006, and Sergey Lavrov’s step-by-step plan of 2011) are illustrative of Moscow’s 
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willingness to contribute to the diplomatic track and disperse tensions and 
war speculation (ElBaradei 2012, 137).1 And arguably, Iran’s decision to turn 
the Russian plan down was one of the factors contributing to Russia’s growing 
impatience with Iranian tactics and the impression that Moscow served as a 
diplomatic shield for Tehran in the UNSC (Mousavian 2012, 256-257). Critics of 
Russia’s “good faith” diplomacy in Iran’s nuclear dossier, however, have pointed 
out that Russia’s monopolistic energy politics and its geopolitical power politics 
over the Caspian Sea account for a lack of genuine Russian interest in a long-
term normalization of relations between Iran and the West.2 This has occasionally 
nurtured the impression that Russia was flirting with the idea of using the Iran 
nuclear talks as a vehicle for obstructionism in order to get concessions in other 
domains. Such an impression of the Iran nuclear talks as a bargaining chip was 
alluded to again in Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s remarks, on March 
20, 2014, on Russia’s potential reconsideration of its position on the Iranian 
nuclear dossier in light of Western pressure over Moscow’s Crimea policy.
Russia shows a reluctance to agree to international sanctions on Iran, yet 
conveys a desire to be perceived as a constructive player in the Iranian nuclear 
dossier. Further, it cannot be in Russia’s interest to see a nuclear Iran emerge on 
its southern flank, since that would have obvious implications for the regional 
power balance and challenge Russia’s nuclear monopoly in the region. Although 
a nuclear Iran cannot be in Russia’s interest, Moscow does not support any plans 
for regime change.3 It is in this context that Russia has also worked to disperse 
war threats. Faced with dangerous rhetoric about pre-emptive strikes against 
Iran on the part of other stakeholders, Russia was incentivized to propose 
political solutions within the P5+1 format. It remains to be seen how Russian 
policy planning will react to the new chance for dialogue with the Rouhani 
administration and the possibility of a U.S. paradigm shift on Iran that will 
necessarily affect Russo-Iranian relations as well. 
Similar to Russia, China was skeptical of U.S. rhetoric that began to 
securitize the Iranian nuclear file. China underlined the Iranian obligation to 
prove the exclusively peaceful character of its nuclear program, but refrained 
from departing from pre-conceived assumptions over Iranian intentions. In its 
official diplomacy, China repeatedly emphasized Iran’s legitimate right to peaceful 
nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT, criticized Western pressure on 
Tehran, and reiterated the importance of political dialogue (Dorraj and Currier 
2008; Garver 2011, 81-84; Mazza 2011; Nourafchan 2010, 39; Swaine 2010, 6-8; 
Yuan 2006). China was also critical of what it perceived as double standards in 
nuclear diplomacy, with Iran being harshly criticized for its lack of transparency 
while the West remained silent on the nuclear activities of non-NPT members 
such as Israel, Pakistan, and India, amounting to what China criticized as “nuclear 
favoritism” (International Crisis Group 2010, 4). Against the backdrop of the 
controversial Iranian nuclear file, it was especially the Chinese supply to Iran of 
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sensitive nuclear technology in the 1980s and 1990s that was viewed with concern 
by Western governments (ElBaradei 2012, 117). When the Iranian nuclear file 
reached the UNSC in 2006, China prevented quick condemnation of Iran and 
braked efforts to impose sanctions in what has been characterized as a “delay-
and-weaken” strategy (International Crisis Group 2010, 12). Like Russia, however, 
it eventually approved of resolutions that imposed a UN-backed sanctions regime 
on Tehran because of its continued lack of cooperation. And like Russia, the 
Chinese government does not accept additional unilateral sanctions imposed by 
the EU and the United States as being legitimate.4 
In analyses of China’s Iran policies, the importance of China-Iranian oil 
trade, commercial Chinese investments in Iran, as well as the exports of Chinese 
goods to Iran that fill the void created by unilateral Western embargoes are often 
emphasized (Burnam 2009; Chen 2010; Dorraj and Currier 2008; Djallil 2011; 
Garver 2011; International Crisis Group 2008; 2010, 5-7; Zhiyue 2012). After 
Saudi Arabia, Iran is China’s second largest oil supplier. China is also benefitting 
from Western sanctions imposed on Iran, since Chinese companies are happy 
to step in and fill the void in the Iranian market. In this way, Beijing is seen 
as walking a tightrope between pursuing its commercial interests in Iran and 
showing receptiveness to international and Western security concerns. China is 
careful not to spoil its relations with the United States or to provoke perceptions 
that run counter to the official Chinese image of “peaceful development” by 
openly contravening existing sanctions lists. Also, like Russia, China did not 
hinder UNSC sanctions resolutions, trying to balance a pragmatic commercial 
approach to business in Iran with mollifying Western security concerns related 
to the Iranian nuclear program. Ignoring the latter would convey a disregard for 
Western perceptions not only of Iranian intentions, but also of Chinese foreign 
policy towards Iran, and fly in the face of China’s public diplomacy pursuing an 
increasingly international profile that reflects the country’s growing importance 
on the world scene. This is also evidenced by China’s reduction of Iranian oil 
imports in order to qualify for U.S. sanctions waivers (Lohmann 2013, 4). 
Unlike Russia and China, Turkey did not have the diplomatic leverage 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear program that a permanent seat in the UNSC grants. 
Nevertheless, while the government in Ankara could not prevent or approve 
the imposition of international sanctions on Iran, its rhetoric resembled the 
cautious positions of China and Russia. Turkey criticized the use of sanctions as 
political tools in international relations, warned of unhelpful pressure on Iran, 
and emphasized that only political dialogue would achieve a long-term solution 
to the diplomatic crisis emerging over the nuclear program of neighboring Iran.5 
Turkey’s Iran policy has often been a balancing act between the need to uphold 
good-neighborly relations in line with Turkey’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” 
and “Strategic Depth” doctrines, as formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmed 
Davutoğlu, and a certain sensibility for Western security political concepts that 
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alliance structures like Turkey’s NATO membership indirectly imply (Pieper 
2013a). In an attempt to negotiate a political solution to Iran’s nuclear crisis, 
Turkey engaged in a process of proactive diplomacy and managed to secure the 
first Iranian agreement to a proposed fuel-swap deal in May 2010 (Parsi 2012, 
172-209; Kibaroğlu 2010, 105-107). From early 2010 Turkey, together with Brazil, 
started negotiating as a mediator between Iran and the P5+1. Even though the 
U.S. administration was hesitant at first to accept Turkey as a mediator—largely 
due to Turkey’s new regional assertiveness and Erdogan’s occasional anti-Israel 
rhetoric—the U.S. State Department conveyed, as early as 2009, U.S. appreciation 
for any Turkish efforts to help alleviate tensions over the Iranian nuclear case (Parsi 
2012, 181). As a nuclear fuel swap proposal by the Vienna group lost momentum 
in late 2009, Brazil and Turkey seized their chance for a diplomatic initiative, 
separately at first, then by way of a coordinated shuttle diplomacy beginning in 
January 2010 (ibid.). In addition, both had become nonpermanent members of 
the UN Security Council in 2010—a development that conveniently bolstered 
their political weight as mediators. The Turkish shuttle diplomacy with Tehran in 
2009-2010 was an illustration of a remarkable foreign policy activism that served 
at least two purposes strategically. While assuring the United States that Turkey’s 
commitment to international diplomacy was in line with Western security and 
non-proliferation priorities,6 Turkey’s mediation also conveyed a prioritization of 
political dialogue. At the same time, it underlined the rejection of sanctions as a 
counterproductive means of pressuring the Iranians. The unexpected rejection of 
the May 2010 deal by the United States, and the subsequent imposition of UNSC 
sanctions resolution 1929 just one month later, frustrated Ankara and abruptly 
ended the short-lived episode of Turkish mediation in the Iran dossier.7 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iran is followed with a watchful eye in 
Washington. For example, the “gold-for-gas” deal between Iran and Turkey was 
seen as a Turkish attempt to circumvent the U.S. unilateral sanctions regime on 
Iran (Kandemir 2013). As much as Ankara shows receptiveness to the security 
perspectives of its NATO ally, the imperatives of geography (Iran as a neighbor) 
and of economic pragmatism (the need for oil and gas deliveries) impose 
constraints on Turkey’s regional and general foreign policy. These constraints 
occasionally create a level of friction between the United States and Turkey over 
their respective approaches to Iran, even though Turkey hurries to emphasize the 
importance of solidarity with its U.S. ally.8  
Contesting Hegemony: Normative Disagreements with Iran 
Sanctions Regimes
A Coxian understanding of hegemony proceeds from an analysis of its underlying 
material, ideational, and institutional structures. According to Cox, hegemony 
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is “based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material 
power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) 
and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of 
universality” (1981, 139). 
The cases presented in this article show all three dimensions of a U.S. 
hegemonic security culture towards Iran that is being contested by China, Russia, 
and Turkey in different adaptations. It is at this point that a distinction between 
norms and rules should be made. Drawing on Katzenstein’s (1996, 21) definition 
of culture as “a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set 
of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors 
exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another,” “norms 
and values” are here understood as concrete convictions and conceptions, while 
“rules and models” relate to the broader macro-structure that regulates the 
way these norms and values are communicated, applied, or changed. All three 
states advocate an adherence to the institutional framework of the UN system as 
embodying the underlying rules and models of international politics. Unilateral 
sanctions regimes, however, circumvent these rules and models. Contesting the 
legitimacy of extraterritorialized U.S. legislative action, therefore, becomes a 
normative divergence from hegemony. The U.S. unilateral sanctions regime in 
place is arguably the ultimate expression of hegemonic power structures. Initiated 
with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996 and extended to a comprehensive 
sanctions regime, the United States imposed punitive measures on other states 
that do business with Iran (Lohmann 2013)—an “imperial extension of American 
power and … [a] sheer effrontery by which America sought to impose its political 
position,” as Ali Ansari (2006, 144) puts it. Such a process of extraterritorializing 
U.S. legislation and enforcing political conceptions onto other states through 
compliance under the threat of economic costs is the epitome of hegemonic 
coercion on the basis of the U.S. predominance in the global trade, financial, and 
economic systems. 
With regard to unilateral sanctions, a European External Action Service 
(EEAS) official remarked in an interview, “China and Russia explicitly do 
not share this sanctions policy.”9 Chinese, Russian, and Turkish conceptions 
of legitimacy in this regard pertain to a desirable security culture that resists 
hegemonic politics. Thus, sovereignty and non-interference are norms that 
should govern international relations; they are the ideational underpinning of 
what would be a Coxian counter-hegemony. In this context, interference is not 
only understood as the physical intrusion into the territory of another state, as 
in the case of a military invasion, but equally captures the intrusive effect that a 
comprehensive sanctions regime can have on a country. As is the case with the 
Iran sanctions regime, such “secondary sanctions” even have an intrusive effect 
on third countries because of undesired interactions with the sanctioned entities. 
Likewise, sovereignty is a concept whose link to hegemony is crucial; the 
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rendition of enmity (i.e., the construction of an enemy image) is an order-
constituting exercise because it presupposes an acceptance thereof by a relevant 
audience (Williams 2003, 514; Campbell 1993; Klein 1994; Balzacq 2010). 
Being able to exert control over transgressions thus means being truly sovereign 
(Agamben 2002, 25; Schmitt 1993, 19). If China, Russia, and Turkey, therefore, 
reiterate legitimate Iranian rights to develop nuclear energy, they implicitly raise 
questions of sovereignty in that they question the non-granting of such rights 
on the part of hegemonic powers. Placing restrictions on nuclear fuel cycle 
development is perceived as encroachments on sovereignty. Russia’s and China’s 
advocacy for more “democratic” international relations is indicative of an effort 
to advance the ideational dimension of a security culture that resists hegemony, 
eliminates power asymmetries in international relations, and hence democratizes 
them. Chinese and Turkish warnings of the counterproductive effect of punitive 
and pressuring policies that undermine diplomacy are indicative of the same 
intent. China, Russia and Turkey have publicly advocated for a security culture 
that rejects politics of aggression vis-à-vis Iran and therewith have sought to “de-
Westernize” discourse on Iran. This will be the subject of the next section. 
The De-Westernization of Iran Discourses
“Rationality” and “responsibility” in the international system are inherently 
subjective notions. The discursive usage of these terms, therefore, presupposes 
intersubjectively shared meanings. The narrative of an irrational, irresponsible 
Iranian leadership is a powerful example of the instrumentalization of a discourse 
on logic. States that do not share hegemonic values or political structures are 
labeled irresponsible, unreasonable, renegade counter-poles. Since the Islamic 
Revolution propelled an anti-American regime to power in 1979, Iran has been 
positioning itself in opposition to policies crafted by the West, and by the United 
States in particular. Both sides (Iran and the United States) have used this official 
rhetoric of mutual stigmatization for political reasons for the last three decades. 
The “axis of resistance” rhetoric, used to denote resistance to Israel and American 
presence in the Middle East, is illustrative of such a discursive construction 
of competing worldviews (Posch 2013, 27). The social construction of statist 
identities for public relations purposes is often simplistic and even dualistic when 
combined with the means for foreign policy portrayal of an “enemy.” What can 
be a self-proclaimed axis of resistance may be an Axis of Evil in an antagonistic 
discourse. Foreign policy discourse and state identities thus have to always be 
understood in a relational context. 
China, Russia, and Turkey advocate for security cultures that do not 
necessarily coincide with hegemonic conceptions of the need to counter an 
irrational Iranian leadership said to pose a threat to peace and international 
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security. Doing so, they have positioned themselves between an actor that 
explicitly resists hegemony (Iran) and the hegemon itself (United States). In this 
way, their foreign policy discourse has occasionally shown more appreciation 
for the Iranian perspective according to which the West aims to deprive Iran of 
technology that it has a legal right to use. Chinese, Russian, and Turkish public 
diplomacy can be read as a discursive attempt at desecuritization of the Iranian 
nuclear file. This diplomacy was also meant as an act of de-escalation of what 
was felt to be an emotionally charged, politicized discourse emanating especially 
from Washington. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as Patrikarakos (2012, 
30) aptly writes, created a political fault line between the developed and the 
developing, the modernized and the modernizing world. Beyond technical 
and legal disputes about Iran’s nuclear program and its rights and obligations 
as an NPT member, it is thus of paramount importance to understand the 
political and ideological dimensions of Iran’s nuclear crisis. This is also key in 
understanding security cultures that resist political hierarchies created and 
sustained by a hegemonic “historic bloc” in the 20th century, and of which the 
NPT as a freezing regime of the nuclear status quo is a prime example. In a neo-
Gramscian understanding of hegemony in international relations, the prevalence 
of dominant structures that are accepted and sustained by a sufficiently large 
number of other actors (states) constitutes a historic bloc. To the extent that other 
states act upon, sustain, and reinforce U.S.-dominant structures in the social, 
economic, and political sphere, U.S. hegemony post-1945 has brought about a 
historic bloc in a Gramscian understanding. 
In their foreign policies towards Iran’s nuclear program, China, Russia, and 
Turkey are thus resisting the ideational dimension of hegemonic structures. Their 
acceptance of the rules of the UN system, however, demonstrates their adherence 
to the institutional dimension of the broader macro-structure through which 
international politics are channeled, conveyed and communicated, as shown in 
the previous section. The Chinese and Russian approval of international sanctions 
in the UNSC is a case in point. While UNSC-backed international sanctions 
were approved with their consent, additional unilateral sanctions efforts are 
seen as illegitimate. Besides these ideational and institutional dynamics, the 
third dimension of Coxian hegemonic structures is one that explains a seeming 
contradiction in the advancement of such a resistance to hegemony, and therefore 
requires some elaboration. 
Non-Western Iran Policies in a Period of Hegemonic Decline 
The previous sections have examined the extent of Chinese, Russian, and Turkish 
adherence to the ideational and institutional aspects of the Coxian triangle of 
hegemonic structures. The following section turns to the third aspect of this 
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triangle—the material dimension. A material dependence on the U.S.-dominated 
world economy explains behavioral deviation from foreign policies that resist 
hegemony. The official Russian Foreign Policy Concept, for example, bears a 
strong counter-hegemonic mark, as do repeated public statements indicating 
Russia’s aversion to unilateral sanctions policies. “Another risk to world peace and 
stability is presented by attempts to manage crises through unilateral sanctions 
and other coercive measures, including armed aggression, outside the framework 
of the UN Security Council,” the official Russian Foreign Policy concept 
formulates (Russian Foreign Ministry 2013). Unilateral sanctions are regarded as 
“illegitimate,” as confirmed by Russian foreign ministry officials.10 The latter not 
only complicate diplomacy, in Moscow’s thinking, but also have a negative effect 
on Russian companies’ business dealings with Iran. Russian companies have been 
sanctioned for being seen as undertaking unwanted trade relations with Iran 
(Defense Industry Daily 2006).11 An example of Russian flexibility and (temporary) 
compliance with U.S. approaches towards Iran was the non-delivery of the S-300 
defense system as a result of the U.S.-Russian “reset policy” that allowed closer 
cooperation on the Iranian nuclear file (Parsi 2012, 94).12 
China is dependent on Iranian oil imports, and its trade with Iran in the 
weapons and nuclear technology fields has long been regarded with suspicion in 
the West. However, Beijing shows a receptiveness to direct and indirect pressure 
coming from Washington; as much as China is dependent on Iranian crude oil 
supplies, policy-makers in Beijing are cautious not to overstep the mark set out 
by U.S. Iran sanctions (Pieper 2013b, 315). The Chinese reduction of Iranian oil 
imports in order to qualify for U.S. sanctions waivers against Chinese companies 
(Lohmann 2013, 4) is a forceful case in point for an adherence to a U.S. normative 
framework. Besides the material motivation, such compliance arguably has to do 
with the perception of China’s foreign policy and with the impression that China 
is striving to behave like a “responsible stakeholder” in a hegemonic reading. 
From a hegemonic perspective, responsibility is attributed to actors that subscribe 
to the norms of the hegemon, irresponsibility to those that disregard them. 
Turkey shares with China and Russia an aversion to Western pressure 
on Iran. Thus, the government in Ankara has always found itself at a strategic 
crossroads dictated by its geographic location on the one hand, and its integration 
into NATO alliance structures and a commitment to Western security policies 
on the other. Emphasizing that sanctions are counterproductive political tools 
to force Tehran to the negotiating table, Turkey engaged in a phase of proactive 
mediation in 2009 and 2010. This was intended to reduce tensions and propose 
diplomatic initiatives to the Iranian nuclear standoff. Even though securing the 
historic first Iranian agreement to a proposed deal in May 2010, this episode of 
Turkish mediation ended as a policy failure when UNSCR 1929 was adopted only 
a month later. The subsequent retreat from an active role as mediator—while 
not shying away from venting its disappointment with Western impatience—
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was proof of Turkey’s alignment with U.S. positions. Given this stance, Turkey 
constantly finds itself in need of justification for its imports of Iranian oil—
contrary to U.S. efforts to convince its allies of its economic isolation policies 
vis-à-vis Iran. While showing receptiveness to U.S. intentions, Turkey does not 
cut off the most cost-effective oil imports from neighboring Iran. Geographic 
and economic considerations partially trump perceptions of solidarity with U.S. 
policies. 
This is an important observation that explains perceived inconsistencies in 
the Iran policies of states like China, Russia and Turkey when filtered through a 
Western lens. While these states have advocated for foreign policy approaches to 
address Iran’s nuclear program different from those of the United States, they have 
still faced the imperatives of certain material constraints; Turkey cannot ignore 
the geographic imperatives that come from its location as Iran’s neighbor and its 
ensuing dependence on Iranian oil imports. The integration into the international 
financial system as part of the U.S.-dominated international economic governance 
structures is another such material constraint. This is illustrated by the effect of 
unilateral sanctions on Chinese, Turkish, and Russian companies trading with 
Iran. Were China, Turkey and Russia cut off from the international trade and 
financial system, the sanctions regime would not affect them to the extent that it 
intends. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to assume that their reaction to, and 
public diplomacy regarding, such intrusive measures would be different.
Turkey repeatedly called for a political solution to the Iran nuclear crisis, 
emphasized the importance of diplomacy, and warned of the counterproductive 
effect of sanctions, but nevertheless showed solidarity with the United States, as 
Turkish announcements about the reduction of Iranian oil imports demonstrated 
(Habertürk 2012). Turkey complied with Iran sanctions, even though this 
compliance was “costly,” as formulated by a Turkish foreign ministry official.13 
China and Russia put the brakes on sanctions efforts in the UNSC, watered down 
resolutions and condemned pressure on Iran, and showed a stronger public 
anti-U.S. posturing than Turkey did. On a behavioral level, however, China and 
Russia also complied with U.S. policies, as the Chinese qualifications for the U.S. 
sanctions waivers, or Russia’s renouncing of the S-300 sale to Iran, demonstrated. 
A discrepancy between discursive and behavioral levels can therefore be 
observed. A public advocacy for resistance to hegemonic policies is paralleled 
by compliance on a behavioral level. Grudging acceptance of a U.S.-inspired 
sanctions regime on Iran allows China, Russia, and Turkey to collectively join 
the camp of “responsible” states because they adhere to material structures put 
in place for (U.S.) politico-ideological reasons. A normative disagreement with 
U.S. hegemonic structures, therefore, did not entail an all-out rejection of U.S. 
policies towards Iran. It was, instead, the relative dependence on the United 
States that led China, Russia, and Turkey to tacitly accept parts of a hegemonic 
security culture despite this being against their normative conceptions. Variation 
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in norm compliance on the part of the case study states has to be seen in the 
context of their respective bilateral ties with the United States, the perception of 
their foreign policies toward Tehran and elsewhere, and their stakes in avoiding 
a confrontation with Iran. These stakes are, as has been shown, both material 
and ideational. It is the construction of norm perception that influences material 
imperatives pertaining to adherence or rejection of hegemonic structures, 
and vice versa. This observation harks back to the reciprocal effects between 
ideational, material, and institutional underpinnings of power structures in a 
Coxian understanding of hegemony.14 Rather than singling out one dominant 
side of the equation, it is the joint effect of these factors that needs to be taken 
into account for an understanding of Chinese, Russian, and Turkish policies in 
relation to Iran. 
Suffice it to note that this is not meant to imply that the Iran policies of 
China, Russia, and Turkey are crafted in a joint effort to challenge the U.S.-
dominated system of governance. Rather than theorizing on counter-hegemonic 
bloc movements, it is arguably a more insightful endeavor to analyze the 
respective interactions of foreign policies with hegemonic power structures 
and to examine their collective effect on the crafting of a security culture that 
resists those structures—even though these foreign policies have their different 
motivations, constraints, and preconditions. 
Contesting Hegemony and Moving into a Post-American World
Iran’s nuclear crisis is not about physics, but about hegemonic politics and 
about a conflict whose resolution will have far-reaching implications for the 
dialectic between the modernizing and the modernized world. It will also affect 
perceptions of world order in a process where the U.S. role as a shaper of world 
hegemony is declining. 
At the heart of the Cold War over Iran’s nuclear program lie over three 
decades of traumatized U.S.-Iranian relations. Technical solutions to end this 
nuclear crisis have been proposed, discussed, and rejected. It is the mistrust on 
both sides that prevents any politically easy solution to a crisis whose resolution 
will entail a new chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations. Iranian Foreign Minister 
Zarif once more reminded the assembled decision-makers at the 50th Munich 
security conference, in January 2014, that the West does not have a “monopoly 
over mistrust.” Only mutually acceptable proposals to craft a nuclear “endgame 
scenario” for Iran will succeed in ending what Zarif called, in late 2013, an 
“unnecessary crisis.” The replacement of the confrontational rhetoric of the 
Ahmadinejad administration by a conciliatory tone under Rouhani’s leadership 
has allowed a historically constructive dialogue with Iran that marks a new 
phase in the decade-old nuclear crisis, and that led to the first interim agreement 
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on Iran’s nuclear program in November 2013. Against the backdrop of these 
dynamics, a Russian foreign ministry official remarked in an interview that 
the U.S. position had embraced an approach that Moscow had already been 
advocating for years.15 Dmitri Trenin (2014) even writes that “the U.S. adoption 
of a gradualist approach toward Iran that Russia had long favored resulted in a 
breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear issue.” Historic developments beginning 
in the late summer 2013 thus make it all the more relevant to reflect on foreign 
policies that resist hegemony. This is a most timely endeavor at a time when the 
world is witnessing a shift in hegemonic structures as P5+1 talks with Iran aim to 
hammer out a comprehensive nuclear solution with Iran to succeed the Joint Plan 
of Action of November 2013. 
It is no wonder that Western observers of Russian, Chinese, or Turkish 
foreign policies cannot but conclude that their policies appear ambiguous. States 
that sit on fences because they are torn between different security cultures, 
strategic circles, or geographic crossroads are bound to pursue multidirectional 
foreign policies. To the outside observer, these policies occasionally appear 
incoherent or opportunistic at best, and politically unfaithful at worst. Exclusive 
and essentially simplistic categorizations are a recurring mantra of foreign policy 
projections and rhetoric. It has been shown in this research how an investigation 
into Chinese, Russian, and Turkish policies toward Iran can offer more nuanced 
understandings of foreign policies between such exclusive camps. 
The decline of hegemony and “the rise of the rest” are too often portrayed 
in dichotomous terms. Studies of the BRICS and “emerging powers” typically 
analyze the changing international economic system in a multipolar world and 
the shift of power equations that growing economies of emerging powers bring 
along. This stream of literature has brought hegemonic transition theory and 
power transition theory—in the context of systemic leadership contestation by 
newly emerging powerful states—to renewed scholarly attention.16 Understanding 
foreign policies that are not “Western” and do not necessarily share the same 
normative framework with a Gramscian historic bloc—but still work with 
the rules of the system instead of working to overthrow them—requires a 
more differentiated perspective on the dynamics of gradual power shifts. The 
coexistence of established and emerging powers will inevitably determine the 
design of the future world order. Research is needed to examine this relationship 
beyond the accommodation-confrontation spectrum. 
It is in precisely this context that Richard Sakwa (2011) has coined the 
concept of “neo-revisionism” to make sense of foreign policies that do not directly 
question or challenge the essence of the international system (as revisionist states 
would do), but indirectly aim to revise its functioning. In a similar vein, Serfaty 
(2011, 18) describes China and Russia as “prudent revisionist powers.” Such 
concepts aim to avoid over-theorizing about foreign policies that do not coincide 
with that of the “system leader” as expressions of the advancement of alternative 
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norms in international security governance. 
Torn between resistance and accommodation, and under the constraints 
of the current political momentum, temporary as well as structural perceptions, 
and the imperatives of history, the foreign policies of China, Turkey, and Russia 
in the Iranian nuclear dossier cannot but appear as “essentially ambiguous” when 
filtered through a Western lens.17 The U.S. leadership role is declining, but an 
entirely alternative international order is not yet in sight. As long as the U.S.-
dominated historic bloc exists, China, Russia, and Turkey will work with and 
through the international architecture in place. This does not mean that these 
states will accept the same norms. An acknowledgment thereof allows for the 
debunking of confrontational policy rhetoric and for more nuanced research on 
post-hegemonic power shifts. It also transcends the unhelpful divide between 
“norm-setter” and “norm-taker,” and helps us to reflect more accurately on the 
future coexistence between former hegemonic and emerging powers. 
Conclusion
This article has carved out the commonalities in Russian, Chinese, and Turkish 
resistance to a consensual hegemonic order as demonstrated by a comparative 
analysis of their foreign policies towards the Iranian nuclear program. For 
hegemonic power structures to become established and sustained over time, 
they presuppose an acceptance by a sufficiently large number of other actors. The 
acceptance of such structures constitutes what Cox calls a “historic bloc” (Cox 
1996, 131). By implication, the rendition of enmity becomes order-constituting 
in hegemonic systems; i.e., it serves to sustain the structures in place and to 
reconfirm prevalent ideologies. Challenging such a rendition of enmity, therefore, 
is akin to resistance to hegemony, as this article has tried to show.
A twofold distinction between a discursive and a behavioral level has been 
made; while Chinese, Russian, and Turkish officials publicly advocate for an 
adherence to a security culture that emphasizes compliance with the norms 
of “sovereignty” and “non-interference,” their level of material and political 
dependence on the United States prompts them to follow foreign policies that still 
comply with U.S. hegemonic structures. The U.S. unilateral sanctions regime and 
compliance with extraterritorialized U.S. legislation is the most prominent case in 
point. 
Russia, since the discovery of Iran’s hitherto covert nuclear program in 
2002, has emphasized the Iranian right to use peaceful nuclear energy and, until 
the referral of the Iranian nuclear file to the UNSC and the adoption of first 
Security Council resolutions, has largely shielded Tehran from international 
pressure—as has China. While Western governments observed Russian-Iranian 
nuclear technology cooperation with a watchful eye, Moscow continued to 
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make a distinction between legitimate commercial ties and an alleged military 
dimension of Iran’s nuclear program. Likewise, Chinese provision of sensitive 
nuclear technology to Iran, as well as its commercial exploitation of Western 
embargoes on Iran and its dense ties with the Iranian oil economy, have been 
seen as undermining Western attempts to increase international pressure on 
Iran. Turkey presents itself as a U.S. ally in the region and is committed to NATO 
alliance structures. Materially, its location as a geographic neighbor of Iran and 
the imperatives of economy, however, impose constraints on Turkey that make 
Ankara disagree with Western politics of securitization of Iran’s nuclear program. 
In political discourse, however, Turkey has emphasized the importance of 
political dialogue to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis and has been skeptical of the 
use of pressure and sanctions on Iran. 
Chinese, Russian, and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear 
program arguably breathe the ambition to partially “de-Westernize” security 
cultures and discourses toward Iran. On a discursive level, their foreign policies 
display a normative divergence with a U.S.-inspired security culture towards 
Iran. At the same time, one must be careful not to over-theorize on indications 
of counter-hegemonic forces struggling to topple the prevailing power system. 
Respective foreign policy motivations are diverse. The “de-Westernization” of 
Iran discourses is therefore not to be confused with a joint endeavor to create a 
counter-hegemonic bloc opposing U.S. leadership.  
China, Russia, and Turkey resist a hegemonic security culture on a discursive 
level. Advocating for a non-hegemonic security culture conveys a normative 
divergence, a deviation from hegemonic normative frameworks. Their relative 
dependence on the United States, however, leads China, Russia, and Turkey to 
follow foreign policies that accept parts of a hegemonic security culture. The 
implementation of the international sanctions regime, even though potentially 
contrary to their economic interests, and, even more tellingly, the Chinese and 
Turkish reduction of Iranian oil imports in order to qualify for U.S. unilateral 
sanctions exemptions, are cases in point. Partial acceptance of such hegemonic 
structures is predicated upon a level of political and material dependence on the 
United States. And the acceptance of UN-backed international sanctions explains 
a convergence of rules that are still accepted as governing international relations 
at large. This seeming variation in norm compliance is visualized by a two-level 
Table 1. Two-level Model to Capture “Resistance to Hegemony”  
Discursive level Behavioral level
Adherence to security 
culture
Advocacy for non-hegemonic 
security culture
Compliance with a U.S.-inspired 
hegemonic security culture
Degree of resistance to 
hegemony
Normative divergence with 
hegemony
Rules convergence with 
hegemony
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model to capture “resistance to hegemony,” as shown in Table 1.
The coexistence of established and emerging powers will inevitably 
determine the design of the future world order. We are at a historic juncture 
where the working relationship between former hegemons and rising powers as 
potential challengers is already being re-balanced. In this regard, with different 
prioritizations and conceptions of legitimacy by the different actors involved 
becoming manifest, the Iranian nuclear crisis arguably is not only a battlefield 
for the survival of the NPT regime, but is a debate about differing conceptions 
of world order and security governance. Chinese, Russian, and Turkish foreign 
policies toward the Iranian nuclear program, as analyzed in this article, stand 
indicative of alternative security cultures toward Iran in a “process of power 
de-concentration” (Tessman and Wolfe 2011, 218) in which dominant power 
structures have not been replaced by alternative governance structures—yet. 
The resulting seemingly ambiguous variation in compliance with the norms 
advocated by the case study states themselves is to be explained by the friction 
between contestation and consent in a gradual process of U.S. hegemonic decline 
and power de-concentration. At a time when U.S. foreign policy on Iran seems 
to be undergoing a paradigm shift, such a finding sheds light on the dynamics of 
international power shifts that will, one way or another, determine international 
politics and the coexistence between declining hegemonic powers and norm-
shapers in the making.
Notes
The original draft of this article was presented at the International Studies Association’s 
55th Annual Convention held in Toronto, March 26-29, 2014. The author thanks Licínia 
Simão and Mehran Kamrava for their helpful comments. 
1. As also reiterated by a Russian foreign ministry official. Author’s interview, Moscow, 
April 18, 2013.  
2. Author’s interview with high-ranking Swiss diplomat, Berlin, August 26, 2013; 
Author’s interview with Dr. Walter Posch, SWP, Berlin, June 25, 2013.
3. Author’s interview with Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Moscow, November 13, 2013.
4. Author’s interview with Chinese foreign ministry official, Beijing, April 18, 2014.
5. Author’s interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, June 17, 2013. Cf. 
also Udum 2012, 103-106; Mercan 2009, 18-19; Kibaroğlu 2010, 4-6; Üstün 2010, 20; 
Larrabee and Nader 2013, 27. 
6. Turkey could base its diplomacy on the consent of the Obama administration, as 
evidenced by a letter written by U.S. President Obama to Brazilian President Lula in April 
2010 in which he explicitly welcomed Turkish-Brazilian diplomatic initiatives (Mousavian 
2012, 383; Parsi 2012, 187). 
7. Author’s interview with Turkish high-ranking diplomat, Brussels, May 29, 2013. 
8. Author’s interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Washington, D.C., February 
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14, 2014.
9. EEAS official, author’s interview, Brussels, June 4, 2013. 
10. Author’s interview with Russian foreign ministry official, Moscow, April 18, 2013.
11. The sanctions against Sukhoi, imposed because of alleged violations of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, were lifted again in November 2006 (Ria Novosti 2007).
12. Dr. Alexei Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO, asserts 
that the S-300 decision was the “peak” of the U.S.-Russian reset policy. Author’s interview, 
Moscow, November 13, 2013.
13. Author’s interview, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2014.
14. And is also in line with a theoretical framework sympathetic to moderate 
constructivism. 
15. Author’s interview with Russian foreign ministry official, Moscow, November 12, 
2013.
16. Seminal examples discussing global power shifts and prospects for international 
cooperation among power poles are Gilpin 1981; Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 
1980; Keohane 1984; Kagan 2002; 2012; Kupchan 2012.
17. Sakwa (2002, 366) has used this formulation to capture Russian foreign policy re-
orientations following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
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